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PREFACE 
In the midst of' the turbulent decade or the 19'.30 11 s, Japan by her words 
and deeds attempted to eliminate all foreign influence tram China, Japanes~ 
influence alone sxceptedo Since the Manchurian Incident o:t 18 September 
1931, Japan had by degrees moved to force all other nation~ out of North 
China. On 17· April 1934, the gradual approach apparently gave way to a 
hasty one as Japan issued a challenge to the world to keep "hands off" 
China.l Amau Eiji, the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman, asserted that 
Japan opposed foreign undertakings in China tending to disturb the peace 
or Asia or to take advantage or Chinao. By the Amau statement Japan ap,.. 
parently asserted for .itself the right to pass judgment on the de$irability 
of all foreign aid, foreign loans 9 or sales of military equipnent t~ China. 
Japan apparently claimed the right to preserve the peace in E:ast Asia. 9 
this right deriving fr.om her intimate knowledge or the needs or China.o 
Finally, Japan warned that the political situation in China concerned only 
Japan and Chinao Ambiguously Japan 51 at the same time 9 reaffirmed her de-
sire to observe the Open Door policy and to uphold her obligations under 
the Mine ... Power Treaty that called for the Signatories (Ja.pan9 China, Great 
Britain, the United States, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium., and 
Portugal) to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China. 
One of the major obstacles to a study of this nature is the general 
unavailability of many of the original documentso Many 11 naturally9 are 
1For the complete.text see Appendix A,, Other versions of' the state .. 
ment are found in Appendices B through Do The difference in wording 
though not in meaning is due to di:f':f'erenttranslat.orso The text in Ape. 
psndix A. was considered "official" since it was issued by the Japanese 
Government. · : 
iii 
still classified by the governments involved. Fllrthermore, the limited 
number of Chinese and Japanese language documents readily available, and 
with my even more limited knowledge of the languages has prevented ttds 
study to be probed as deeply as I would pref'er. There was, however\, enough 
material at hand to dispel some of the uncertainty surrounding the 
question. 
Deep indebtedness is acknowledged to Professor Sidney Do Brown of 
Oklahoma. state University, who first propounded the question of the Am.au 
Statement, and who guided me in my research and writing. Also, I would 
like to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professors Homer Lo Knight, Oo A. 
Hilton, and Alfred Levin, all of Oklahoma state University. Also my 
deepest thanks and appreciation of the Oklahoma State University Library 
who tolerated my idiosyncrasies and forgetfulnesso Lastly, I acknowledge 
my debt to Charles Stanislaw of the Animal Jhsbandry Department or Oklahoma 
State University and my roommate, who tolerated my long disquisitions on 
the theory and practice or History .. 
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CHA.PTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The AirJau statement "fell among the Diplomatic Corps like a bombshell" 
and set ott a f'l.urry of reactions throughout the wrldo 1 The arbi trar.r 
assumption by Japan as.the moderator ot peace in the Pacific area was not 
welcomed by the world, though the world seemed to have no intention of 
disputing this claim by forceo 
Am.au Ei.ji, the Foreign Office spokesman, who released the statement 
was a relatively unknown figure when he first caught world notice.. To 
this point his career was routine. Born in 1887 in Narutc City9 Tokushima 
Prefecture on the small rustic island of' Shikoku, he began his rise in the 
world upon graduation from the Tokyo Higher Commercial School in 1912 .. 
Promptly entering the Foreign Service, he had labored in min©r positions 
f'or two decades before winning promotion to the post of Chief' of the In.,, 
telligenee Bureau., From this position he released his famous statement~ 
and, whether, because of it or not, became Ambassador to Switzerland and 
Italy., Did ambition prompt his statement? Nathaniel Peffer thought so 9 
calling Anlau "a blustering ·young diplomatooo 9 who had ooneluded that 
success in Japan was to the egregious and he had affiliated him.self with 
the extreme miliatri,ts and their plans, hoping to rise with their su@cess.,•2 
lHUgh Byas, ~New~ Times, 19··Apri+ 1934, 10; .tb!, (London) 
Times, 19,April J.934, 14. 
2Natha,niel Peffer, The Far :East: !, Modem Histo (Ann Arbon The 
University of M:lohi(?an Press, 19m; 371. Ironic y .Amau who defied the 
League of Nations in11934, became in 1948 the Vice Chaiman of the Unesco 
Committee of the United Nations., 
l 
2 
others believed that Am.au won fame.,..,..or notorietyo.,..by :ac.ci,den.t. Wilfrid 
Fleischer, the journalist who released the statement to the world, a 
journalist who knew Ama.u personally11 observed that the Japanese spokesman 
was "devoid ot ~ sense ot news value, ooo and little realized the im~ 
portance his words might baveo n'.3 
Amau, whether he spoke unwittingly or tor ambition11 s sake, spoke 
against a. backdrop of militarism· and expansiono By 1934 the Military 
Establishment bad begun to shape foreign policy for China. This despite 
the Constitutional provision that specifically placed foreign affairs in 
the hands of the Foreign Office. The Military Establishment, or gundai, 
could do this by' reason of its virtual independence of the civil govern-
ment. No civilian could. command the Imperial A.?med Forces, not even the 
Premier. Nor could a civilian block direct access to the l!)nperor on the 
part of mUi tary leaders. China under partial control of the Japanese 
Army was a China beyond the control of Japanese civil gover:nmento or~ 
ticially in 19'.34 the civil authorities who still controlled the government 
sought reconciliation and good will with foreign na.tionso The moderates 
'.3-w11tr1d Fleischer II Volcanic D!! ( Garden Cityg Doubleday, Doran and 
Coo, 1941), 259. Amau 9S imediaie superior was Vioe ... Foreign Minister 
Shigemitsu Mamol"U (1887-1957). Born in Oita prefecture ::1.n Kyushu, 
Shigemitsu graduated from the Geman Law Section of Tok;vo Universityo He 
entered the Foreign Service and served at various posts in several 
countrieso He lost a leg to a. bam.b thrown by' a Korean fanatic in Shanghaio 
Convicted as a Class A War Criminal in 1946, he received a seven year 
sentence, had it commuted,to five years and was paroled after serving fouro 
He served as Foreign Minister a.ga.::1.n from 19.54 to 1956 when he helped to 
n,gotiate normalization of Soviet Japanese relationso 
... ;,. H;i.rota Koki (187S....1948) Foreign Minister and Amau 11 s ultimate superior 
was·born in Fukuoka Prefeetureo He attended the Genyosha school, a 
fascistic ultra,..,;nationalistie organization that bad advocated overseas 
expansion ever since 18810 After this he graduated from Tolcyo University 
Law Schoolo He joined the Foreign Service and held posts in various 
countries 9 becoming Premier after the February 26, 1936 Incidento He was 
considered one ot the.promoters of fascism in Japano He was hung as a 
Class A War Criminal ::1.n 19480 
:3 
a.t.tM!"t,ed .. in the years after the Manchurian Incident of 1931 9 to regain 
ror Japan ~he respect of the worlde Their efforts were beginning to bear 
fruit when .A.'1'1!lu destroyed their program by issuance of his famous state= 
ment.,4 
4ll12. (London) Times 9 20 April 1934, 13. 
CHAPTER II 
THE JAPANESE REACTION TO THE AMAU STATEMENT 
The Japanese reaction to the A.mau statement was slow in c0ll1ing; at 
first few persons grasped its signif"icanceo Perhaps Japanese commentators 
· ignored it because they believed that the Amau release espoused no new 
principles since it simply described the path in foreign relations 
followed by Japan for the past twenty yearse1 When adverse foreign re~ 
actions began pouring in, the unqualified approval initially given by the 
Japanese to the statement changed to a tone of moderate Griticismi In.. 
nuential persons and nearly all large ne1'1Spapers now regarded the 
language of the declaration as awkward; an unfortunate choice of words. 
The Japanese attacks on the statement were directed at its phrasing and 
tA.ming, however, not at its substa.ncee 2 The Ama.u statement was never 
publicly repudiated, though modified in tone by various government of ... 
f'ioialso Even Foreign M:bdster Hirota was "reported to be angry and dis ... 
tressed at Am.au Os action., n:3 Still, Hirota. never did discipline Amau; and 
many prominent Japanese regarded the :rambunctious Foreign Off'iee spokes= 
man as a national heroa4 In short the Japanese reaction to Ama.u 11 s 
1R., To Pollard, "Dyn~cs of Japanese Imperialism," Pacific Histori-
.2!! Review, VIII ;(March, 1939) 9 5., 
2 .. 
Jo e .. Grew, Ten Ye~,!!!, Japan (New Yorkg Simon and Schuster, 1944), 
129; ~ !!~,!: York :ffiii'es·, 25 April 1934, ,1~ , 
3Grew to Hull. 9 20 April 19349 in Fo~isn Rela.tio~9 19349 III9 11.5@ 
41:nternational Military Tribunal for the Far Fast0 J·ud_ge111ent, Part 
B, Chapter VI, 628.. ·. • 
4 
and diffuse .. 
The Rea@tion of Government Officials 
when newsmen and foreign diploma.ts sounded erut Japanese ©f:t:lc:lals as to 
the meaning of the astounding deelara..tion by A:mauo An'ibei.ssador· Grew 
cabled t.o Washington a M.:!t:"row ~mterpretation of the sta:\l:.a."11!.ent by an un ... 
Foreign Officeo According to this official, the substance of the Am.au 
statement, that Japan merely wished to be e©nsdt'3d by ta.11 other nations 
before they- invest in China 9 constituted the hea:tt of th~ sta-tezru.\l:nt in 
the opinion of those in charge of Japan°s relatil;ins wlth China.. He said 
to check other powers in China. 9 but did not itself oontemplat11; @my um\= 
lateral action in Chir.a...5 A f\n:•ther axriplificatiein (!if ·thi.s ws glwen by 
td th l',.l12, !~'!!. ~ ~~ CO:t'Jl"espondent in Sh&nghai,, M:rr .. A:ieiy©sh.i sf.lid that 
Japan expected to enfcnrice her p©l.iey only by pressure @n China 9 not bs'J 
pressure against Westem powers ·whi~h might seek to c@n©lude agre~;nileints 
with China., 6 
Other members of the Japan~se Diploma.ti@ C©]:'>ps th@u.ght the world 
5G?>®w to fllll; f~r3~"-:U. P..eJ&~.~io,~~ 19349 III\) 20 April 19'.,P.~ 9 ll8., 
6Ib£ ~ I,o.rk ~~9 23 April 1934, 1 .. 
6 
peace :in Asia in conjunction with other :Eastern .Asia.ti~ natiems •7 In. a 
subsequent interview Yoko;rami claimed a more exclusive role for Japan, 
saying that Japan envisaged the Powers as standing around the sick bed of 
China, but that Japan al.one wa.s"able to diagnose the trouble correctly .. 8 
The Japanese ambassador to Washington, S~ito Hiroshi, co~.firmed Yokoyami's 
contention that the Western Powers did not understand China nor k"aow how 
to d.eal with her; only Japan had this knowledge.. He further declared 
that the present chaotic situation in China. was a present danger to 
Japa.n.9 Saito did seem perplexed though, at the brusqueness ot the 
language in the Amau release,. but said that essentially the principles 
. ' ' 
laid down were quite accurate.1° Foreign Minister Hi.rota, however, 
cancelled out these wild efforts to interpret the statement, saying that 
Japan wa.s not the only power capable of understanding China. He dis ... 
missed Yokoyam:t•s contention as unconsequential, and pointedly observed 
that Yokoyami did not speak for the Japanese government. 
A responsible Foreign Office official, Mr. Shigemitsu Mal?,oru, the 
Vice .... Ml.nister of' Foreign Affairs, and Amau 11 s :immediate superior, fully 
' 
endorsed the statement made by his subordinate.. He asserted that this 
fomed a part of Japan 11 s fixed policies in China and ,e't<:rill be ©arrled out 
regardless of tl.e opposition or other na.tions.nl2 The highest responsible 
official, Foreign Minister Hirota. 9 did not endorse the statement as 
strongly as Shigemitsu. At tirst he rather evaded the problem. In his 
?Ibid., 24 April 1934, 10; The (London) T:imes 9 24 April 1931+, 14. 
--- ' 
8The (London) 1'1mes, 2°6'~ri1"19J4~ '14. ·, 
9Ibid., 23 April 1934, 14. 
10,k ~ ~ Times, 25 April 1934, 1. 
lln,1d., 26 April 1934, lo 
120rew to Hull, 20 April 1934, in F.2,reign R!Mt;!O:M,, 19349 III, 119~ 
7 
discussions with Ambassador Grew, Foreign Minister Hirota. went to great 
lengths to assur~ Grew that Japan would take no action that would ~rea.te 
friction or that would run counter to the letter and spirit of the Nine ... 
Power Treaty. Japan was maintaining the Open Door in China while; by 
contra.st, China. was trying to close it with her boyoott of Japanese 
goods.13 In another interview with Grew on 29 April 1934, Hirota said 
that. the Amau statement had caused a "gr~t misunderstanding" and t..lia.t he, 
Hirota, would. give a reply to the American fide-memoire which dire~ted 
Grew to ascertain the official status of the Am.au statement, if' any.14 
Despite Grew's attempts, he did not succeed in pinning down Hirota as to 
whether he approved of the sta~em.ent, or not. The Foreign Minis~r always 
vacillated or evaded forthright endorsement of the Amau deela~ation. Many 
' 
of Grew•s diplomatic colleagues scoffed at H:1.rota0 s patent 1.nsinoerl.ty 
though Grew felt that Hirota made the best of a bad situa.tion.15 Hirota 
.· I I 
c;ould not repudiate the principles of the statement since they summed up 
basic trends of Japanese foreign policy tor the past twenty years. 
Fu.rther, the ultra-nationalists• pressure ~d allow no public repudia ... 
~ion ot these principles.16 Why did the Foreign Minister equi:vocate? The 
I 
Toky'o correspondent of l'h! (London) Times reported that Hirobt apparent;y 
.believed. that the A.mau statement itself was innocuous but that Ama:11 :mis ... 
:handled the release. The subsequent crisis he expected soon to blow o.ver~17 
l'.3J. c. Grew, Turbulent_ Jk!_ (Boston: Houghton-ffl.ffiin9 1952), II, 
960; The New York Times,~ April 1934, l; The (London) Thtes 9 26 April 1934,12.-- · -
14Grew, .:!'!.!. Years ~ Japan, 133. 
l.5orew, Turbulent Era, II, 958-961. 
16The New York Times, IV, . 29 April 1934, l; Grew .... Turbulent El?a. 9 II, 960-;- - - - "' ....,,_ 
17The (London) Times, 25 April 1934, 14. 
8 
If this was indeed ffirota 9 s hope, it was dashed to pieces alm.~st immedi-
ately. The affair was still raging when Hirota called in Tokyo a ~Qn-
ference of the Japanese Ambassadors from the United States, G~eat Britain, 
France, Italy, the Soviet Union, and China to meet late in Apri1 9 19340 
The purpose was to discuss Japan°s China policy ~i..!"".!-m the other 
interested Powerso18 The results of this conferenee were never· releap,fd 
but the results led the Foreign Minister to adopt a stiffer tone in this 
matter when he addressed a Conference of Provincial Governors on May 4, 
1934 .. Before the Conference he stressed a more positive policy toward -
China.a He declared that Japan must guard against any action detrimental 
to the independence of Manchukuo, the Japanese puppet state that had been 
carved out of Chinae Also, he reiterated the idea that J~pan had a sin-
cere desire to preserve Chinese territorial integrity and unification but 
this must come from China's own efforts 9 no outside help would be toler-
ated except Japanese~ He concluded with the standard Foreign Office state$ 
ment that he expected a termination of hostilities in Chiria. very shortly .. 19 
This last was more in the nature or wishful thinking for home cons1..1.111ptiono 
The Japanese Amy had been fighting in China sin@e 1931 and had won all of 
the battles 11 but she was still a long way from conquering Chinae Mean= 
while, the expected windfall from Japanese aggression in China had not 
materialized and the Japanese economy was subjected to a constant strain~ 
The Newspaper Reaction 
Whereas Hirota moved to firm support of the statement only after 
several days of va:;illation the Japanese newspapers at once greeted the Alr.au 
18!!':!, ~ ~ Times~ VIII 9 30 April 19349 11 .. 
19The (London) Times 9 5 May 1934, 12 .. 
9 
release with general acclaim. Five of the major dailies 11 a.11 :national-
istic in tone, agreed with the substance of the statement. The T?tFl.£ 
Asahi, the Jiji, the Chugai Shogy;o, the Hoch!, and the Yom.iuri firmly 
supported the state111ent. 20 The Asahi d.escribed the statement as an "epoch ... 
making" departure, whereby Japan had abandoned her former policy of co-
. I l .1 
operation with the other Powers in China. From now on9 East Asians would 
settle East Asian problems. In short, the affairs in China. concerned only 
China and Japan. The Asahi further stated that Chinese cooperation was 
questionable,21 but agreed that the declaration well defined the cause of 
J~pan on the 111ainland. The Hochi approved of the statement in principle 
but felt that the wording was too abstract. This in turn led to mis ... 
understanding abroad. Also, it was issued at the wrong time-before an 
understanding had been reached through diplomatic channels with other 
nations. 22 
The more sensational newspapers reviewed the "American Bogey" with an 
exaggerated report that the United states was going to give a $100,000,000 
Chinese loan to Chiang Kai-shek; while the Yomiuri gave prominence to a 
dispatch saying that the Soviets were secretly building military air bases 
' ' 
in Kamchatka with the intention of leasing these ~ses to the United states 
in event of war with Japan. 23 
The strongest voice in opposition to the Amau statement was that or 
the English language Japan Advertiser, a paper edited for foreigners rasi~ 
dent.in Japan. In the Advertiser's editorial column, Wilfrid Fleisher 
2~Grew to Hull, 20 April 1934, in Foreign Relations, III, 12. 
2lrud., 121. 
22.'!'h!, (London) Times, 24 April 1934, 10. 
2'.3~ !.!:! I2!!s, Times, 24 April 1934, 10. 
10 
expressed doubt that other nations would accept the Japanese thesis con .. 
earning aid to China.24 A major Japanese language newspaper that did not 
join the patriotic bandwagon was the Kokumin. It predicted the strain 
that the .Ama.u statement would create in United Sta.tesmJapanese relations. 
The Kokumin urged reconciliation saying, "If America is on our side we 
need not :fear any combination of other Powers. 1125 This urging was based 
less on love for America than on a realization that if Japan and the 
United states joined together, they would be absolute masters in the 
Pacific. This alliance, however, belonged to the realm of fantasy given 
the realities of the Japanese-American rivalry in 1934. The semi-official 
Japanese news agency, Rengo, clouded the issue by its alternating press 
releases. On 22 April 1934, it issued a bulletin that announced that the 
Japanese Cabinet had fo:mally approved of the claim to exclusive :rights in 
China pu.t forward by Mr • .Amau on April 17. This was immediately denied by 
Amau himselr. 26 Then on the night of 23 April 1934, the Rengo Agency 
announced that the .Ama.u statement enunciated clearly Japan°s policy toward 
China. Again on the following day, Renso announced that the Japanese 
policy did not confiict in any way with the Nine-Power Treaty or the Open 
Door; it was merely aimed at stopping the supply of war planes to China .. 
The Forwign Office immediately declared that this statement was completely 
unauthorized.2? 
The papers that had whole-beartedly agreed with the Amau statement 
. '\ 
at the time of its release found occasion to denounce the Foreign Office 
as first news of the hostile foreign reception trickled in. The Asahi 
24Grew to Hull, 20.April 1934, in Foreign Relations, 1934, III, 121. 
25The ~ !2t!s. Times, 21 April 1934, 8. 
26The (London) Times, 27 April 1934, 12. 
27Ibid., 25 April 1934, 14. 
11 
called it "a shocking blunder" while still endorsing its contents. The 
nationalistic papers now roundly- condemned the Foreign Office f'or its in-
ept handling of the matter. The Asahi went on to say that Japan had been 
following the sa.me course since 1931 and should have caused no misunder ... 
standing among the other Powers but the Foreign Office tumbled the ball 
and must take the blame for the bad situation that existed.,.28 Within a 
week af'ter this the Tokyo correspondent of I!'!!, (Lendon) Times cabled 1ihat 
the consensus or opinion of Japanese newspapers held that the Am.au state-
ment was a clear announcement t.+ the world of Japan's a.ttitu_de toward 
China but that the other Po:wers clearly disagreed with Japa.n.,.29 
The Military Reaction 
The Japanese military, according to Joseph Grew and others 9 was 
caught by surprise when the Ama.u statement was tµ.ven out. Five or the 
vernacular newspapers, The Tom Nichi-Niohi, the Tolqro Asahi, the Jiji, 
the Chugai Shogzo, and the Hochi, besides endorsing it, said that the Army 
authorities unqualifiedly supported the stand envisaged in the Arnau state ... 
ment,30 and Hu.gh Byas, a noted Asian expert and the~ York Times corre~ 
spondent in Tokyo, agreed with this tn.esis in a dispatch to his paper. 
Byas did not give the origin for this statement except to say that it came 
f'rom highly accurate. and credible sources.31 It the military with its 
. ''-
important and pretigious role in Japanese poll tics was caught by su1'p1•;se 
as Grew and Byas contend, then the Amau statement could hardly have been 
28The (~ndon) Times, 30 April 1934, 14. 
--
29Ibid., 3 May 1934, 14. 
121.,. 
30orew to HU.11, 20 April 1934, in Foreign Relations, 1934, III, 120.,. 
31The New York Times, 29 April 1934, 32. 
- - - --
12 
issued as an otfioial release. The statement reflected the military view 
ot the situation in China and army leaders undoubtedly app?"Oved or it,'.32 
although we have no evidence that they were consulted in advance. This 
could be a parallel to the Twenty-One Demands in 1915 9 when army leaders 
such a.s Yamagata were furious at the manner in which it was issued. 
Perhaps as a coincidence, possibly by army plan, the Re;ego News Agency on 
24 April 19'.34, only seven days after the Jtmau s~tement was released, 
announced that Japan planned to double her aircraft strength within the 
I 
next three years. By 19,fj~pan expected to add eighteen squadrons 
( 500 planes ) • '.33 
The Intellectual Reaction 
The recognized leaders of public opinion outside the Government 
evinced varied reactions :ranging from approval to di~approval. The 
warmest defender of the Amau statement was Matsuoka Yosuke, an Ame:rican-
echlcated Japanese, who had served in the Japanese Government but was 
currently out or ottioe. Matsuoka was incensed at the Western Powers for 
supplying China with arms, finance, and internal improvements .. He con-
tended that these strengthened China suf'ticienrtly to enable that land to 
resist the Japanese forces encroachmento To Western interf'erence he 
attribtlted the lack or peace and the unsettled conditions in Chi:na.,'.34 
'.32Grew to Hull, 20 April 19'.34, in Foreign Relations, 1934, III, 120. 
'.33The (London) Times, 25·11.pril 1934, 14. 
'.34.rhe New York Times, 29 April 1934, lo Matsuoka Yosuke (1880-1946). 
Born in Yamagu°cEr'"Pretecture on the southern tip of Honshu island, he at-
tended school in the United states where he graduated from Oregon Univer~ 
sity. He served briefiy in the Japanese Foreign Service and then resigned 
to join the South·Manchurian Railroad in 19210 By 1927 he was Vice ... 
President of the road, and in 1939 he became President of the SMR. In 
1930.he was elected to the Diet on the Sei:yukai ticketo In 1933 he an ... 
nounced Japan°s wlthdra.wal f'rom the League of Nations and in 1934 he 
13 
The New York ti.mes said that perhaps the ultrana.tionalistic Matsuoka more 
--~ -. 
clearly reflected the spirit of the Japanese people than did Hirota, whose 
modification or the Ama.u statement pleased neither the Japanese nor the 
foreignerso 35 
.At the other end of the political spectrum, the more liberal-minded 
politicians, led by Baron Shidehara, strongly di~approved of the .Amau 
demarchi. They regretted the issuance of such a statement at the time 
when Japanese foreign relations were beginning to calm down after the 
Manchurian. Incident. None of these liberals, however, criticized the 
principles laid down in the release, only the timing)6 
If .Ama.u r~eived a censure :f'rom the Foreign Office, he at the same 
time, won praise and congratulations from many non-Foreign Office people 
who concurred in the views he had publicly announced.37 Vice-Foreign 
.Minister Shigemitsu said that Japa~ should have used more tact and 
. 
patience and eventually the world would have .accepted the situation in 
Manchuria and China.38 Prince Konoye Fumimaro, a weather ... oook politician, 
' 
was distressed at the timing of the statement, not at the prineiples.39 
resigned from the Diet and began calling for a dissolution or all politi-
cal parties. He was appointed Foreign Minister in 1940 in the Konoe Cabi-
neto He toured Ea.rope in 1941 and concluded the Soviet-Japanese Non-
Aggression Pact. This pa.ct freed Japan for her coming war i..'l the Pacif"io 
Ocean. He died while on trial as a war criminal. 
35rbid., IV, James, F.dwin L., 29 Apri11934, 1@ 
3~Th.e !!! York Times, i5 April 1934, 10; Grew to Hull, 20 April 
1934, Foreign Re!ations, 1934, III, 115-119. 
37T,Alfrid Fleischer, Volcanic !!!!, (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and 
co.~ 1941), '-14 •. 
38Shigemi~ Mam.om, Jaen !E.9. li!r. Destin,y (New Yorki Dntton and co'9, 
1958), 97098. 
39 Fleischer, Volcanic Isle, '-14. 
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The eionsemsus of opinion among the intellectuals as well as the common man 
was that the Government used very poo:t' tim.ingo Japan was on the vel"ge of 
gaining the confidence of the world when the release, turned all the·past 
gains into ashes.40 
Many people inquired of Amau himself' as to the meaning of his well 
publicized statemento He expressed surprise that his statement caused 
such a stir th1~oughout the world.. It was merely a reitera:tion of' the 
principles laid down by the Foreign Minister in his 23 January 1934t 
Diet speech. Amau constantly repeated that his statement did not con.. 
flict in any way with aey existing international agreements with China..41 
In general the Japanese reaction against the statement was almost as 
strong as that of other countries but with this difference: the ot.her 
count.ries expressed ala.rm. and concern at the principles laid do1..m., while 
the Japanese expressed concern over the timing, language and method o.f 
relea.se. On the whole, the Japanese were receptive to the ideas in this 
declaration and Arnau certainly gained in domestic popularlty. It may 
well have been an a.coident that Amau :lssued the sta.tell"1ent, bu:t it CE'f:ttain... 
ly created a world-wide disturbance. 
-
40The (London) Times, 25 -April 1934, ; 14 •. 
41··. ..· . 
. . The e York Times, 19 April 1934, 10; Grew to Hi.ill, 20 April 1934, 
in Forel'g,n Reiatrons, ·1934, III, 112 .. 113; .~ H,~X'.;Q_he~ter Guardi~ !l~~klz, 
XXX i20 April i934j, 307; The (London) Times, 21 April 1934, 10; 
Chamberlin, va.pan 2!!!: !sia.TBoston: Littie, Brown and i:;o., 1939), 6, J. 
Rosooe- Drummond, "Open Door Off' Hinges in Ma.nchukuo 9 " l:h~ 
Science ~tom;.t2,!., 21 December 1934, 1. · 
CHAPTER III 
THE UNITED STATES RFACTION TO THE .AMA.U STATMNT 
The United States Government was alarmed over the Japanese declara ... 
tion but took no immediate action.1 The state Department was not willing 
to express interest in what it felt to be an unofficial statement. Any 
such action would tend to give the statement official s~~nding, something 
it did not enjoy at the time of its issue. 2 Still, the statement emanated 
from an important enough source that it could not be disregarded) state 
Department lawyers temporarily divided into two groups over it~ possible 
legal effects. One group maintained that silence was the best policy 
since."consent by implication" was impossible under any circumstances, 
-while the other held that the United States should get itself on record 
a~ soon as possible to a.void any future misunderstanding of its attitude.4 
This pnpasse was resolved when it became obvious that the statement cot.'l.1.d 
not be ignored. It had already stirred up much world-wide ~ttentiono 
Although the United States was not willing to go to war over the Amau 
statement, the State Department was quick to reaffi:t:m the .American 
1 . . . 
Co A .. Buss, ~ I!.£ East: A History 2!, Rec!m,'t,. ~ Contem:e2rary 
International Relations in F.ast Asia (New York: The Macinlilan Coe, 1955), 
:390; Grew._to Hull, 20 April 1934, in Foreign Relations$c) III, 117; The New 
~ Times, 18 April 1934, 12., .. - -
2Grew to Hull, 20 April 1934, Foreign Relations, III, 117; Th~ N~w 
1.2!!. Times, 26 April 1934, 13; !b2. ttondon) Ti.mes, 2 May 1934, 14. -
3stanley K., Hornbeck, ~ United .§.tates ,!!!!! ~~ !!t Ft,i.stt ,Q,!_rtain 
Fundamentals £!.. Policy (Boston: Wor!d Peace Foundation~ 1~9 33., 
4The ~ Yo~k Times, 27 April 1934, 9 .. 
1; 
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position in Chirdt; and that we would not recognize the Am.au statement as 
valid;5 This move was unambiguous and specific in denying the Japanese 
6 claim. The State Department was aware of the possible adverse effects 
on the American aid program to China that the .Amau stat~ment portended, 
and it was, at the same time, equally clear that the Stimson Doctrine of 
moral pressure a.nd non-recognition of territorial gains by force had 
failed in China. The American answer was not as firm as both Cordell· 
Hull, the Secretary of State, and President Roosevelt wished, but the 
political climate was such that the American people would not have toler-
ated a war with Japan at this time) 
The American and British reactions paralleled each other, although 
they were arrived at independent.1y and without any prior consultation. 
The U:r.ited States hoped that Britain would back her up in the event of a 
showdown with Japan~8 The American Govermnent was soon disabused of this 
hope. London had less inclination than did Washington for a quarrel with 
Japan in the Pacific. The Amau statement and its effects, however, did 
not pa.ss unnoticed by the American news media .. The American public, by 
and large, was aware of the Japanese declaration, but it l-ms preoceupied 
with its own internal problems created by the Depr~ssion.9 
... · 
5Meribeth Cameron et al, China, Ja1an and,~ ~9!".fg ! H~s~ 2:t !!l!. Modern f!!: ~ (New York: The Rona d Press Co .. , 19.52) 9 4n;= 
6H., s .. Quigley, and GQ H .. Blakeslee, The Far Eastg An International 
~rvey (Boston2 World Peace Foundation, l93'ST, 190~ """"" · · 
7varia.n Fry, War in China: .America's Role in the Far East (New York: 
Foreign Policy Ass1n.°,1938) 11 63. · - - -=--= -
8•rh.e .New York Times, 20 April 1934, 10; The 11!,~ehester Guardian 
Weekly, xxx-r27 April 1934), 324; .1'h!. (London) I!tn2§~9 2 May 193Zi:';=Ili,'. 
c ;r.rdght Biggerstaff, The Far F.ast and the United States (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University""Pres°s;l:9~ 327 -- • 
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The Presidential Reaction 
President Roosevelt, like his countrymen, was preoccupied with the 
nation's internal problems. He had little time to spend on foreign a:f' ... 
fairs. This led to a foreign policy less vigorous in some respects than 
was Hoover•s. It showed in the long rtitn, however, no compromising of 
principles and little if' any change in the Stimson Doctrine er Non,.. 
· Recognition of territorial acquisition by force. This position, which 
.did.not involve the use ot force or the threat of :force, was necessary in 
view of the American people's reluctance to go to war.lo That Roosevelt 
took a. serious view o:f' the Pacific problem was· common knowledge. Ac-
cording to Ill!. (Lendon) Time~, President Roosevelt would like to do more 
but ·was hind.ered by a Congress that had a morbid fear or becoming en,.. 
tangled in any foreign alliances or altercations.U Further proof of 
Roosevelt's alam at the Ama.u statement came when he announced that he in ... 
tended tt, ask Congress to start building the Navy up to its full strength 
as author:l.zed by the Ws.shington Na;al Conterenoe of 1922.12 Though the 
possibility existed that Roosevelt would have asked Congress to build up 
the Navy anyway since it was well ... known that he had a fondness for the 
Navy.13 It is tmlikely, however, that he would have asked so soon unless 
he felt alarmed, s:1:nce the finances ot the country were not adequate for 
etribarking on a Naval expansion program. 
" · Perhaps the President0s Japanophobia shaped. his big Navy views. He 
' lOibid. , 32 • 
. nThe (It>ndon) Times, 30 April 1934, 14 •. 
12The J!!l! I2r!5. Times, 26 April 19'.34, 13. 
13.Ib! (London) Times, 26 April 1934, 14. 
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once told Henry L. still'l.son, while a dinner guest at the White House, an 
ancedote which reve~led a personal uneasiness about Japan. While he "Was 
a student at Harvard in 1902, the President told Stimson, a Japanese 
classmate confided that Japan had a one hundred year plan for conquest or 
the Pacific Ocean area. The Japanese student then outlined the plan, one 
remarkably similar to the s~bsequent course ot the nation's expansion. 
This tale, told in 1934, remained clear in stimson•s mind for the next 
seven years.14 
The State Department Reaction 
The Amau statement came as.a shock to Secretary ot state Hull, 
though it was no surprise. It meant that after a brief conciliatory inter-
lude, Japan had reembarked on her old course or armaments, treaty breaking, 
and aggression. BJ.1.1 cou1d not let this pass unchallenged.15 In May, 
Hall observed in a f'ormal statement, that .American opinion would not per-
. 16 
mit Japan unilaterally to break the Nine-Power Treaty. Prior to the May 
'', 
statement, the American Government had dispatched a reply to the Japanese 
demarche. This reply was delayed for over a week while the American 
Government decided on a coura..e ot action ... The situation was so oompli ... 
cated with cross currents and cross wires," said ~ ~ l'!.r.!. Times, "tha t 
the time was not ripe for a reply. ,t17 Requests to the Japanese Ambassador 
14H. L. Stimson, and McGeorge Bundy, .Q!. Active Service !!'!: Peace ~ 
if!t (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), 301 ... 302. · 
15cordell Hull, Memoirs, I (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), 
279. 
16F. R. Michael, and George E. Taylor, The Far Ea.st in the Modern 
World (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,195b),° ~ _,. -
l'?Arthur Krock, The !'!l!: ~ Times, 27 April 19'.34, 20. 
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for an official copy or the Amau statement 't-rare unavailing for several. 
days, consequently no answer could be fomul.ated. Also, according to~ 
(London} Times, the state Department waited.tor the British reply before 
committing itself since the British were the largest foreign investo~ 
18 
nation in China. 
The United States reply, reported by .Ib!, (London) ~~, revealed 
that this nation questioned the Japanese assertion of several "realities" 
t~t existed in China, such as the ~stenoe of Ma.nchuku0 and Japanese 
primacy in north China and the insistence that all nations recognize them. 
These were "selected realities" at best and could not be accepted by the 
Powers. Many of these Powers had interests and connections with China 
·' .:. 
long antedating Japan's opening to the West, the State Department 
continued. The Japanese pretense that only she understood China because 
b~th were Oriental was naive and unacceptable to the West.19 
The Alllerican stand on the Amau statement was greeted favorably in 
Gre•t Britain and lukewarmly in China. Britain hailed it as the first 
stand that the Roosevelt administration had taken on Asian affairs.20 The 
Na.nkingGovernm.ent of Chiang K'ai-shek called the American reply "rather 
.weak but generally satisfactory ••• At any rate we are now sure_ wh~re 
America stands in this matter."21 The .American reply referred to above, 
was dispatched on 30 April 1934. This dispatch, unequivocally Wormed 
Japan that the United States insisted on complete observance or all 
treaties and that sbe would not recognize a.ny peculiar interests and 
18The (London) Times, 26 April.1934, 14. 
19Ibid. 
20Ibid., 2 May 1934, 14. 
21The !!;! l2rk, Times, 3 May 19'.34, 6. 
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rights or Japan. 22 This reply was interpreted by both the United states 
and Japan as including all of Asia., not only China a.lone. 23 
The American of'tioial most intimately concerned with the .Amau state~ 
. . 
ment was Joseph c. Grew, the United States Am.bass$dor to Japan, who was 
·a.this post when the Am.au statement was issued. Grew was a career diplo .. 
mat with many yea.rs service in Ea:rope and Turkey before his assignment to 
i 
Japan. Both Grew and Roosevelt had attended Groton and Hal"Val"d. Rosevelt 
went on to Columbia. Law School while Grew attended George iivashington Uni-
versity. This similarity or background may explain the mutual esteem that 
~oth men held tor each other. Grew, like Roosevelt, never f'ully trusted 
Japan though he did a creditable job while Ambassador and gained many 
Japanese friends. He h~ld the opinion that the statement was a true re-
tleotion of Japanese feelings regarding China, but the Foreign Office, 
for diplomatic reasons, maintained an aloof position enabling it to deny 
the off'icial standing or the by now famous statement. Grew also believed 
that it was open to broad 'interpretation, and tor the present it would 
not be enforced by Japan. Further, at.first Grew did not feel that any 
answer was warranted until a more definitive transla ti.on was <>'btained than 
the one printed in lb!, . !!?!~ He:rald ... Mbune. The only way to obtain 
this was to ask the Japanese Foreign Minister, Hirota Koki for an official 
copy but this Grew refused to do until ordered by Hl.111., 24 Grew, also, was 
of the opinion that the British had acceded too hastily to the Japanese 
assertion ot sped.al rights and realities in China. At the same time, 
Grew felt that the American reply was "wholly admirable, absolutely called 
for by the oircumsta.nees, dratte_d in a masterly fashion, perfectly clear 
22The Nation, CXXXVIII (9 May 1934), 520. 
23~ !!!! I9rk Times• 2 May 1934, 11 .. 
24orew to Hull, 20 April 1934, in Foreig~ Relat:i.O?llS9 1934, m, 11.5. 
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in substance, ~ns]"moderate and friendly in tone."25 Ambassador Grew 
was in perfect accord with the policy followed by Roosevelt and Hiil.l. 
It would almost seem that such perfect accord. -was the result of coordinate 
planning. As to how ll'lUCh advice Grew gave in arriving at this course of 
action, one can only speculate. 
The Congressional Reaction 
Congress was to show little interest in the Ama.u statement. Congress 
was aware or the statement and there was comment upon it from the floor 
' . 
of both Houses of Congress, but little came of it. Congress refrained 
from any discussion of the matter until the Administration had had a cl'i..ance 
to act. On 2 May 1934, Senator James Hamilton Lewis, (Democrat, minois), 
rose and in a lengthy speech called for unanimous Senatorial approval ©f 
the State Department's reply to the Japanese statement. He also called 
for unanimous consent on the part of the Senate in endorsing the foreign 
policy.of President Roosevelt and Seoreta.ry Hull toward Asia. In this 
same speech, Senator Lewis decried the weak English acquiescence to 
Japan'~ "special position" in China.26 
Mr. Anthony Joseph Dimond, Territorial Delegate from Alaska, on 7 
. ' 
May, called the attention of the House of Representatives to an article 
written by Senator Arthur R. Robinson or Ohio. Senator Robinson saw 
.Ala.ska as being in danger from a.n atta.ok by Japan which was on a military 
aggression spree. He pointed out that Alaska, or parts of it, were closer 
to-Japa,:nthan they were to the United States. Japan's pa.st actions in 
. . . 
China were a pl,"elude to expansion throoghout the Paoitio area. The United 
~5·Joseph c. Grew, !!.!l Years ,!!!, Japan (N~1 Yorkg Simon and Schusteri, 
1944), 13'.3· · 
26uoso Copgressional Reo,,Qr_q, 73d Congress, 2d Session, 1934, LXXVIII, 
Part ? , 7899. · · · . 
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states must take a determined stand and build u:p Ala.ska t.o be as well de ... 
fended as Pearl Harbor. He corI~luded by sayirig that ;c.he U:td3r,ed States 
could only be secure in the Ori~nt when it was mili ta.:!'.'ily strl'.))ng., T'ne 
problem. of defense could be solved by action, nr1o"t ., ,, o by polite though 
firm notes from the state Depa!&tlnent .. ,.27 This last. sentence was the only 
discordant :note in Congress and it 't-TaS a mild one.. It seemed t,0 be ai"lled 
at, the state Departm.ent0 s reply to the Ama.u statement but th.e arti~le 
read on the floor of the House was written before the stat:ment was i.ssued .. 
It was unintentional but prophetic. 
This was the extent of the pa.rt Congress played in the Am.au stat,e.,, 
ment except to give the President his requested increased naval approp~i,a-
t . 28 :i..ons. That Congress did not take a more positive course in the matter 
of the Am.au statement was not surprising in view of the economic condition 
of the nation at the time .. The .foremost problem facing the nation ·was the 
bringing ba.ck of' prosperity and the President and Congress were immersed 
in this question .. The traditional isolationism in Congress and the 
President-Congress "honeymoon" period7 which was still. in effeet 9 pre,~ 
eluded any runaway act,ion by the legislature in the field of f.orei.gn af'= 
fairs.. Congress, at t.l-ds ti.ma, was content to follow the P:l'."eside:t1.t in 
his foreign policy as long as it did not lead to foreign entanglements .. 
The Press Reaction 
Though Congress took little notice of the Amau statement, the same 
oannot be said for the news med:'l,.a 9 and the press in pa:rrticular., It was 
- "e«:;::tt"O':$ 
27Ibid.,, Part 8, 8257=8259. Mr .. Dimond quoted the artieles of Sena= 
tor Robinson from "Will Japan Seize Alaska1" 11 !tl-,.,Efil'_'.tY M@P'§-,g,;11~.ll 24 March 1934.. · : . = ~--
28u .. so, Sena.te 9 Establish Comwgtion !J! ited _S.;l~t~ .,!\Ta.Yl, " .... 9"' 
'7:3d Cong.,~ 2d Sess .. t f934, Senate Doco 156;. ., uo 9 £9=~~~~;~!!1 ,2!', l!:01!!!;.::h 
~~~, 73d Cong., 2.d Sesso, 19349 Senate Doc,. 157 .. 
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the press which actually called world attention to the Japanese release. 
0£ all the segments of American life, the press was the most ~ro~iferous 
in its reaction to the Japanese declaration. The st-0ry -was first re-
leased in the United States by the~~ Herald-Tri'i;?!tD!l on 18 Apl"'il 
1934, the day after it was issued by .Amau. 
spondent in Tokyo, Mr. Wilfrid Fleischer, who was also the editor of the 
Japan Advertiser, cabled the Am.au statement to the United States from the 
translated edition that had appeared in the Advertiserts morning edition 
of 18 April. 29 The Baltimore ~ as quoted by ~ (I.j,ncioii} ... Time-s"J-,de:;-
elared that China would fall to Japan by default if the Western Powers 
did not take immediate action. The Nine-Power Treaty provided the means 
for this and the signatories should invoke the treaty without delay)O 
l'.!t!.1!!!!2!:!t Times, in an editorial, theorized that if Japan was seri~us 
about wanting peace in China, she should be happy to see China armed. 
A.s long as China was fragmented into small territories held by different. 
war-lords, she would never know peace. If Chiang Kai""shek :r•eceived a1"i.1'J,s 
and secured unification he would suppress and pacify Clrl.na. There would 
then be the opportunity for Japanese trade on a large scale)l ~ !i"N. 
.I2Els, !i;pies printed a guest editorial from the Philadelphia. InguicJ?er 011,,. 
titled "Mena.oe to China.. n It was one of the most outspoken of all A.:m.e1•'1-
can newspaper editorials on the Am.au statement.32 
It is diffioul t to imagine Japan acting as headmaster in a 
sohool of social welfare. That is not her way. She ab~ 
sorbed Korea. She advanced on Manchuria in the name of peace, 
/ 
( 
29Fleischer, Vol¢anic Isle, 2600 
30The (London) 'times, 26 April 1934, 14. 
I 
'.31"Topics of th:e Times," .Ih!, ~ York Times, 27 April 1934, 20 .. 
32j.'he .!:J!.! York Tim,2!, IV, 29 April 1934, 4 .. 
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slaughtering right and lef't and driving China out of her 
possession. When Japan had set up her 01-m government shei 
calmly announced .. that the thing had been done ....... that it 
was ~ fait accomp11 ...... and what are you going to do ab~t ·· 
it? Her invasion of China. proper, hurling death and d:i.s ... 
aster at Shanghai, had no object other than to impress 
the unfortunate Chinese and the world with the ru.tbless ... 
ness of' her power. It is :impossible to believe that her 
present course is not directed toward the virtual domi~ 
nation of China. 
24 
Despite suoh i'i:ery articles, the .American people did not get aroused over 
the Japanese declaration. Perhaps this type of' writing sold a few more 
papers, it did not accomplish mu.ch more. 
The New ReJ¥blic adopted a cynical point of view. As long as Japan 
talked about the activities or the foreign Powers in Chinas, said the~ 
Republic, she would not take any- action. Furthermore, should Japan cease 
talking and attempt to do something about entoro:ing the Amau doctrine, 
the United states would have to either back down or go to war. Should 
the latter course be followed, the United states would be in trouble since 
it is doubtful if' Japan could be beaten in the Pacific, even with British 
help. There was also the possibility that Japan would offer spheres of 
1:nfluence to other European nations if' they would back her in her war 
with America. The editor concluded with a pessimistic note that no matter 
the course followed by the United states, we would lose out in China.)3 
!h!. Nation took a brighter view of the situation created by the 
Japanese statement. It was not sure that Japan was ready to back up her 
threat since Japan's record over the past twenty years indicated her be~ 
lief that China would f'all to her infiuence anyway .. The time would come 
when the Nine-Power Treaty members will have to fa.ct Japan, by force if 
necessary, to pressure Japan out ot China. surely the Chinese could hang 
on until that happened)4 
33nJapan"s Challenge to the West," New Republic, LXXVII (2 May 1934), 
323. 
J4"Editorial Pa.ragra.l>hs," The Nation, CXXX\f!II (9 May 1934), .520. 
. - _......,......,..,.,; 
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As was to be expected, the public expressed its views on the Am.au 
statement in letters to the editors. One such missive was pa.:i."'ticula.rly 
interesting since it adopted a cold-blooded, pro ... Ja.panese view. This 
writer advocated the complete abstention or the United Sta.t$s from any 
act that might attect Sino-Japanese relations. It was none of P..merica0 s 
business what Japan did in China so long as she did not interfere with 
.American interests there. Also, Japan had brought peace and order to 
those parts of China that she had occupied. Japan had also respected our 
Open Door policy since she was motivated only by the highest idea.ls in 
her China policy. As for her military attitude, she had only done what 
the Western nations did earlier when they took over less developed 
countries as colonies and spheres on interest.35 ~is letter was not 
unique, it was merely more eru.dite than most of the others. 
Buch attitudes were all too prevalent in the United States. The tra ... 
ditional American isolationism coupled with a severe economic depression 
at home were almost a guarantee that any po~itive foreign policy would be 
~nacceptable to the American people. The leading American newspapers and 
periodicals did a creditable job or keeping the public informed of world 
affairs, but the intense preoccupation with internal n1atters offset much 
or this effort. 
The Economic Reaction 
The economic response to the Amau statement was almost negligible. 
There was no widespread American business reaction. The American Govern-
ment, however, had always displayed a deep interest in American invest-
ments in China due to its established "Dollar Diplomacy" policy •. The 
3.5Henry A. Wisewood, "Letters to the Editor," The ~ York Time.s.., IV, 
29 Ap:r:111934, 5. 
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government had long sought to force dollars into areas where they Wil.lt'.lLd 
not go of their own accord. The firm stand of the state Dsp~~t.~ent re~ 
garding the Amau statement was a reflection of this interest. Professor 
Charles Frederick Remer, Professor of Economics at the University of 
Michigan, explained this by the fact that the United Stat~s entered the 
contest for the exploitation of China at a late date and could not su.cceed 
without Government backing. Also, American investors have been either un-
successful or unfortunate, or both.36 Of more than the $41,000,000 in~ 
vested by Americans in Chinese Government obligations, only $8,000,000 
were secured by any collaterai.37 This was too risky a. margin .for most 
American businessmen to operate on with their own capital. Since few 
Americans oared to invest in a country as unsettled as China., the Govern-
ment has had to offer backing to get businessmen to invest. The United 
States, in contrast to the European Powers, was hesitant to use its troops 
to protect its interests. Under such conditions it.was expected that 
private investments would be light. In fact, the only signifioa,nt private 
American investments in China. were in public utilities in Shanghai and 
railroads in Manchuria. 
The railroad loans were secured by the rolling stock and the carrying 
profits which were substantial.38 The investments in the Shanghai 
util:1 ties were in stocks and bonds, not in direct physical pla:rrt fa ... 
cilities.39 American companies engaged in business in China were sub-
sidized by the Government after 1922 with the China Trade Act of that yea.Y:. 
Co., 
36coF. Remer, Foreign Investments in China 
1933), 334. ....... (New York: The Macmillan 
37Ibid., Table 11, 301. 
38tbid., 88. 
39Ibid., 335. 
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It was am.ended in 1925 to liberalize the aid even more. This act pro-
vided for certain federal~ exemptions and allowed federal incorpora-
tion ot these firms. Only national banks had enjoyed these rights prior 
to the passage of this bill.40 Another significant facet of American 
governmental interest in Asian investment has been America's traditional 
concern for events in Manchuria where American investments, once large, 
were now small. This interest now derived more on political grounds than 
on economic grounds. "Manchuria has been the chief international politi-
cal problem in the Far Fa.st since the end of the Sino-Japanese war. The 
United states has shown a keen interest in Manchurian railways because 
the solution of the railway problem promised a solution of' the polit:tcal 
problem • ..41 Since Manchuria was sparsely settled and underd.eveloped with 
vast distances to span, a steady reliable transport system was the key to 
develo}'!ll'lent and control of the area. There were no paved roads and even 
fewer vehicles. Without railroads no supplies could be brought in or 
... I . 
produce shipped out. Ot1r American Trans-Mississippi West during the post-
C~vll War era was an excellent example of this~ Hence, the control of 
the railroad was equivalent to control of the country. 
!!,siness ~magazine pointed out another economic facet of the 
Amau statement as it affected American trade in the Orient when it said 
in effect, that China. is a great potential market tor American goods but 
until the disorganization within the country ends, and American manu ... 
facturers adapt their products to a low-income market this potential will 
not be realized. Japan today offers a more ready market tor American 
raw materials such as cotton. This as.pect was true for the long run 
I 
40 
· Ibid., 317. 
41Ibid., 335. 
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picture, but the immediate .Amerioan investments in China, were the chief' 
. 42 
and immediate problem. The United states was· only the fourth largest in-
vestor in China, being surpassed by Great Britain, Japan, and Russia., in 
43 that order. The American investments were valued at approximately 
$200,000,000.44 
An excellent indicator of the business world's. lack o:f any real 
interest in the .Amau statement is evident from the lack o:f any sharp 
trading on the New York stock Ex:ehange. There was no tlurry or selling 
or buying o:f Chinese or Japanese stocks. No American company doing 
business in China showed any indication or fluctuation ot stock from the 
· nol"JUl-., .An examination of the stock quotations in l'.h!, ~ l'2!:k Tim.es for 
the month of April gave no hint of any undue activity on the Exc~nge. 
The state Department displayed more of an interest in the Ja~nese declara-
tion than <:lid any segment of the business world. This could only be true 
if the United states Government was more interested than any other seg-
ment of American life. There was no major American corporation with 
heavy investments in China •. The largest individual American companies 
doing business were the shipping and trading concerns, and even these had 
the majority of their :funds invested in the American end of the business, 
and though a few American rims ·owned their physical :facilities in Ch..1.na, 
these amounted to very- little in the total sum of .American investments. 
American Foreign Policy Before the statement 
The American foreign policy before the A.mau statement can best be 
described as one of non~intervention and non-recognition. Besides the 
42"Bt1siness Abro~d,_" Bttsiness !!.!!5,, (28 April 1934), 30. 
4'.3Reme;, For~igri I~ve~-tments, Chart 2, 75. 
44 Ibid., 239. 
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traditional distaste for entangling foreign alliances, the United States 
was too pre-occupied with its own internal troubles to consider any 
positive action in China over the .AJnau statement. Further, the American 
people were disillusioned over the results of the attempt to remake 
Etlrope into a peaceful community of nations. The United States had pnlled 
Etlrope•s chestnuts out of the fire and Europe was ungrate:f'lll.. The 
Japanese in the Far :East were involved in an "incident" with China that 
had no end in sight. It would only bring grief to the United States to. 
get involved in the situation in China. This pessimistic attitude, 
oci,upl.ed with the domestic problems at home, made it all but impossible 
for the Government to follow any positive course abroad. 
The non-recognition policy, followed by Henry L. Stimson, dated back 
to William Jennings Bryan, according to Cordell Hull. Bryan employed 
this device a:f'ter Japan had presented her infamous Twenty-one Demands in 
1915. 45 George E. Sokolsky, T()kyo correspondent of The !!'!! I2!:.!£ Times 
and a recognized authority on the Far :East, traced the non-recognition 
policy back to John Hay's Open Door of 1900. 46 Cordell Hull, in his 
Memoirs, gave tull credit to Stimson for taking the non-recognition 
principle of Bryan, expanding it, and a ttem.pting to gain world reeogni tion 
for it.47 Stimson, while Secretary of State under Hoover, had tried to 
work with the League of Nations in deaUng with Japan over the Manchurian 
Incident in 1931. He believed that werld opinion could be marshalled 
against Japan through this organization, thus forcing the m.ili taristic 
group to back down in their demands. This then would lead te the 
45cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. I (New Yorks The 
Maomillan Com.paJ:\Y, 1948), 270-;- - ·· · 
46George .E. Sokolsky, ,I!l! ,!!.!: I!!! Tim.es, VIII, 29 April 1934, 11. 
4'?001, Memoirs, 270. 
strengthening of the civilian elements of the Japanese Goverme:nt&48 
Stimson soon grew disillusioned with this idea when it became obvious 
that the di.spa.rate interests of the various members of the League were 
too strong for any concerted action against Japan. 
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As Cordell Bull entered the state Department in 1933, he had t,;,ro 
points on the Far F.ast fi:rmly in mind. The first was the definite inter .. 
est or the United States in maintaining the independence or China and in 
preventing Japan from gaining overlordship of the entire Far East. The 
second conviction was that Japan had no intention whatever of a.biding by 
treaties rut would regulate her conduct by the opportunities of the 
moment. 49 Though Hull was determined to follow these two objectic1Te.s while 
he was Secretary of State, neither he nor President Roosevelt were pre .. 
·pared to use force to halt Japan. The pacifism and isolationism that had 
existed under Hoover and Stimson were still deeply entrenched in the 
50 · 
nation. Roosevelt and Hull, despite their intentions, were hampered by 
the traditional American attitude toward foreign entanglements. 
American Foreign Policy After the Statement 
The United Sta.tes did not modify its policy in China as a result of 
the Amau statement. Neither did the Japanese Government modify the 
policies that foreshadowed this statement • .51 Prior to its issuance, 
Japanese-Amer:1.oan relations had been steadily improving., After th~ 
~nz H. Mieha.el, and George E .. Taylor, The Far Fa.st in the Modern 
Wbrld (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1956), 624~ ~ - - - · -
49Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 270 • 
. -
50Mer!.Beth E. Cameron, Thomas H. Mahoney, and George E. MoReynolds, 
China., :ra:en !!!2, the ·Powers (New York: Ronald Press, 1952), 471. 
51Michael and Taylor, .Ib.!, Far F.ast !t! ~ Modern World, 627,,. 
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statement, the relations steadily declined .• 
The ehill put upon Japanese-American relations by the Ama.u state-
ment was never removed. The attair soon passed over, but the realization 
that the problem ot Ea.st Asian affairs would someday be settled by resort 
to a:rms, lurked in the minds of people on bo~h sides ot the Pacific. The 
two dittering policies of Japan and the United States were bound to clash 
· unless one side gave way. »n.otional factors, arising from the strong 
moral positions attached to their respective policies, made such agree-
ment impossible. '!be United states policy ot a r~.e China, with tree 
trade and access to all nations with no single nation gaining absolute 
power over all or part of China, was destined to clash with Japan's eX,., 
pansionist, imperialist plan to subordinate China to a satellite position 
within the yen bloc. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE EUROPEAN REACTION TO THE AMAU STA TPMENT 
As much as it surprised the United states, the Ama.u statement caught 
the rest of the world oft guard and, in Eu.rope, caused a mild furor. The 
~irst otticia.l reaction came from Great Britain which sidestypped'the 
issue by sending a "friendly inquiry-" on 25 April, as to the meaning of the 
statement. The Government accompanied this with a reminder that Japan 
had recourse to the N2.~e-Power Treaty, which was still in force and of 
which Japan was a member, to voice any dissatisfaction that she might have 
with .the other Signatories as to their conduct in China. Furthermore, 
Great Britain had pursued in China no activity that might give cause for 
1 ' ' . 
al.arm to Japan. France and Italy, whose interests in Asia were much ·less 
important than Britain's followed its lead. Russia, tilling her usual 
role of' profiting by other nation's problems, stood on the sidelines and 
denounced both sides as greedy capitalists fighting over the spoils of 
colonialism. The other nations of' Eu.rope noted the situation but since 
they had little or no interest in Asia, they remained mere spectators. 
Eu.rope was plagued with her own problem.a and had no inclination to become 
' . ' 
involved in an Asian squabble'. 
The British Reaction 
The Amau statement was issued on 17 April 19'.34, printed in lh!, {London) 
lo. E. Hubbard, SUrvl gt, International Af'tairs, W!t, {o.xtord, 1935), 
656. The Signatories of' ~e Nine.-Power Treaty were Great Britain, France, 
Italy, the United states, Japan, China, the Netherlands, and Portugal. 
-~·; 
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Tim.es on 18 April, but not answered by the British government until 
25 April. The reasons :for the week0 s delay in 1mswe1•ing this challenge 
are varied. As mentioned above, the statement took the world by surprise. 
Still, in her history Britain had responded more rapidly to other 
cha1lenges. The British reacted in several stages. The first was a 
"friendly inquiry" on 25 .A.p1-il "-934 as to the meaning or the Am.au state-
ment. The next stage was on 30 April 1934 with the Government's willing ... 
ness to accept the Japanese reply to its i_nquiry wherein the Japanese 
agreed in the British assumption that it in no way transgressed any 
treaties or common rights in China that Japan shared with the other POW$rs. 
With this answer, the British Government was prepar~d to "leave the 
question where it was."2 The Parliamentary Opposition, on 30 April 1934, 
formed the third stage of the reaction when it refused to "leave the 
question where it was." The Government remained adamant, and since the 
Opposition could not muster enough votes in Commons to overturn the 
Government, the question was suspended. British attention soon was fo-
cused on the Ellropea.n situation. The reactions :from the other segments 
of British life were not int"luential in affecting the Government's stand, 
though they are of much interest. Along with Britain's attention to 
Ri tJ..er' s sabre ... rattJ.ing in ]!)lrope, the effects ot the world ... w.tde depreission 
were ma.king themselves felt. There was much unemployment throughout the 
world and Britain was no exception. The Japan.ese declaration may have 
been startling to Britain, but Japan had not previously bothered Britain's 
large in:i,estme;nts in China.. Besides, Japan and Brita.in had long been 
allies in the Pacific, even before the Russo-Japanese war in 1905. Britain 
2Great Britain, 5 Parlia.mentau Debates (Commons), CCLXXXIX (30 April 
1934), 14. 
'.34 
had only a short time before ended any form.al arrangement but the :f:riend-
ly feeling was still supposed to exist. Perhaps another reason for the 
delay wa.s the well-known pacifist principles of the British Prl.me Minis ... 
,ter, Ramsey MacDonal.d 9 who would not ru.sh into a policy that could easily 
lead to war without first giving it deep consideration.'.3 Viewed in this 
perspec~ve, the delay was understandable .. 
British F.oonomic Interest in China 
Great Britain, of all the foreign investors in China, was the 
largest., Over 36<.'ot all foreign investments belonged to Britain. In 
terms of United states dollars, this amounted to $1,189,200,000 .. 4 Pro-
fessor c .. F .. Remer summed up the importance of these investments by ob-
serving "that the histor;y of British investments in China is the history 
of Chinese capital imports. The study of China's international economic 
relations meant ••• the study of British trade, British shipping, the 
British business community, and British investments in China. 115 That 
Britain should be concerned over the Amau statement was to be expected, 
and the Members of Parliament from the English industrial areas that had 
dealings with China were prompt to question the validity of the statement. 
Although they did not mention their investments as such, it is significant 
that these Members took the lead in Parliament in demanding action fro:m. 
the Government. It would almost seem. as if economic determinism were the 
overriding factor in the British foreign policy • 
.. · ... 3Walter P. Ball, Robert G. Albion, and Jennie B. Pope, ! .l{istory; ££. 
England !m. the E>:n:oire ... comm.onweal th (Boston: Ginn and Co. , 1961), 603 o 
4co F.. Remer, Foreign Investments !!'! China (New York: Ma.cndllan and 
Co., 19'.33), Table 1S, 467. · 
5Ibid., 406. 
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The Debate in Commons 
Whatever the Goverrmi.ent 11 s reasons for delaying a week before answer-
ing the sta.tementil they did not extend to Parliament. Two days after the 
Japanese demarche, and one day after it appeared. in The ,!!p!es 9 the Op-
position from the _Liberal and Unionist Parties atta.~ked MacDonald's 
' National Government., This spirited and prolonged offensive lasted for a 
month. It did not eease until 18 May 19349 which was adjournment time. 
The Opposition centered on economic reasons with moral justifications a 
poor second. Olltside of the usual wish of the Opposition to embarrass 
the Government, the concern for British investments in Asia was the 
driving force for the attack. 
The opening shot was, ,fired by the Liberal Member from the Midlands 
port of South Shields, Mr. Harcourt Johnstone 9 whose constituency was 
deeply involved in the Asiatic trade. He wanted to know what Japan meant 
by the Amau statement.6 Since the Government had not yet decided upon a 
course of a.~tion, _Sir John Simon, the Foreign Minister, ever the slippery 
poli tician9 7 put off the question by replying that there were ~ev.eral 
versions of the ,statement and until he received the definitive one he 
8 . . 
would offer no comment.· This was only the start of a. deluge that would 
not cease until the May a.djournmento Every -day brought a series of questions 
~1, 
d,signed 9 it seemed, :more for embarrassing the Government than for elicit-
ing information. ,,In all fairness to the Opposition, however, one must say 
that these questions were legitimate even though the questioners may not· 
have expected to receive answers.o These queries for the most part 
6Parliamentaty Debates (Commons), CCLXXMII (19 April 1934), 1124. 
. ?Helen P. Kirkpatrick, Under !b!, Br:1.tish Umbrellu ~ 1b!, Erl;lish 
!!:!, !!}S. !2!: They ,gg, I! lf!! (New York: Charles Scribner0 s Sons, 1939 , 128. 
8Parliamenta.r;v Debates (Com.~ns) 9 CCLXXXVIII (19 April 1934), 1125 .. 
concerned themselves with Br1tain°s Asian markets. These covered such 
matters as the status.of £:oreign loans to China, the employment or foreign 
advis,ors by China, and cooperation between the Government and the Unite~ 
States. Sir John attempted to·answer these as best he could but his re ... 
. · 
plies did net satisfy the Opposition. He finally promised to answer these 
questions as ~oon as the Gove:rnment received more inf'ormation.9 
During the Oral Answer period on 25 April 1934, Sir John attempted 
to fend off the Opposition. He told the House that the British Ambassador 
I 
to Japan, Sir Francis IAndley had an appointment with the Japanese Foreign 
Minister that very day. It should take a few days to receive an answer 
~ -
thongh. This attempt did little good, however, for the Opposition con-
tinued to ham:me.r at the Government tor the rest of the week and into the 
next. On 30 April, Sir John could report to the. House that the Japanese 
. 
Government had a.greed with the British contention that Great Britain had 
. ll 
not followed aey policy in China that contlicted with Japanese interests. 
Meanwhile, the Japanese diplomats in Geneva, Washington, and Shanghai 
had been "explaining away" the Ama'Q. statement to newspaper reporters with 
dif'f'ering interpretations than tha.t issued by Hirota to the British Govern-
ment.12 Mro Johnstone asked the Government to clarify this situation. Sir 
John immediately replied that one must not believe everything that one 
reads in the papers or that every press release is authorised.·i3 
9 Ibid., 1366 ... 1367. 
lOib:ldo, (25 April 1934), 1692. 
11I~do , CCLXXXIX ( '.30 April 1934), 13, .. 14. 
12.l'h! (London) Times, 23 Apl"il 1934, 14; 24 .(lpril 1934, 14; lb! ~ 
I!?!. Times, 2!> April 1934, l; '£hl'8 explaining away" refers to the state-
ment made b;r:A,mbassador Saito in Washington: and Consul·Yokoyama. in Geneva, 
f:.!lo supra, 5.._6. 
135 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CCLXXXIX ('.30 April 1934), 14. 
Hither'tos, the o@:ncem 'by Commons had been with British commercial 
interests. Now, Mr. Alan E. Lo Chorlton, Unionist Member i'rom the 
Platting Division of' Manchester, and who had spent ma.:n;y years in Russia 
and Germany as_ a civil and automotive engineer9 was anxious to know it 
there had been any measures ta.ken ~o increase the detense ot Si~apore 
. 
37 
in the light ot the Japanese stateme~t? The First Lord of the Admiralty, 
Sir Bolton Byres Mon.sell, informed him that there had been none and none 
were contemplated. The m,es.sures for Singapore0s defense.as embodied in 
' . 
th~ Naval Estimates for 193414 were considered adequate and would not be 
increased at this time.15 For the remainder or theweek, Parliament de-
voted the rest of its time to a more important matter,' the Unemployment 
Bill. 
On Monday, 7 May 1934, the Far Eastern fAeStion appeared again. 
Diring this discussion, the matter or Japan's "special rights" in China 
that were recognized by other nations but not shared by them was brought 
<'.'" 
forth. Sir John replied in the negative, but he did say that insofar as 
-:'·" ,• ' 
the.Japanese are running a peculiar enterprise such as the Japanese Con-
,- J 
OEassion at Hankow, they do have s.pecial rights, the same as Britain in 
h~r entities and enterp:rises.16 
The protracted debate on Tuesday, 18 April, cleared the atmosphere 
that had b_ecome becloud.ed and befogged in rhe-:t,orio. Sir Stafford Cripps, 
Labor Member tor Ea.st Bristol, mentioned what was to become, .in the eyes 
. . 
of man;v, the true cause for the issuance of the startling lapanese decla-
ration. He ~aid that Japan had gotten by with her aggressions on the 
14:tbid. ~ CCLXXMII (12 March 1934), 41 :ft. 
l.5Ibid., CCLXXXIX ('.30 April 1934) 9 24. 
16Ibid. t (7 May 19'.34) S> '71211. 
Asian continent, not because of' her strength, but more because ct the 
. . .... 
West11 s vacill.iation; that Japan, "when the moment seemed opportune, ... 
flew a kite to ascertain the attitude that other Gove~nts were likely 
to take as :regards her claim for a sphere ot 1nnuenQe in China," and 
being pleased with the little disturbance it caused, had proceeded to 
' . 
make this her new offlcial·policy.17 A tour hour deba.:te.tollowed over 
disarmament, and the League ot Nations; and Admiral of the Fleet Sir 
.. Y' •• 
Roger Keyes even spoke in virtual p:raise ot Japan tor her attitude and 
' . . 
actions on the Asian continent.18 The session ended by adjournment for 
the Whitsuntide holidays with the doubts and questions still unsettJ.ed. 
The,, wide variety of opinions and the lack of clarity of pirpose in the 
debates, demonstrated clearly that there was to be no fim course ot 
action prescribed for the present, neither by the Government nor by the 
': . ~· 
Opposition. The bulk of the Opposition were motivated by their concern 
tor the nation's commercial interests, and by their desire to embfirrass · 
tl1.e MacDonald Gove~ent rather than tear of.Japanese aggression. The 
attempt to disconcert the MacDonald Government was led by.the Labor and 
C~nservative Opposition. Labor had a deep distrust of MacDonald after he 
had made what they felt to be a turncoat break with them. Bis pacifist 
principles during the Great War were still lurking in the background and 
his mildly sodli-listic program, although acceptable to Labor, was thorough-
ly distasteful to the Conservatives. 
The Debate in Lords 
The reaction in the House of Lords was as varied as that in the House 
l?Ibid., (18 May 1934), 20,54-2055. 
18Ibid., 2082-2085. 
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or Commons. Here, too, no solution was round. The Opposition attacked 
the Government more for its lack of a. program than•tor the mildness or 
the note d:1.spatched to the Japanese Goverment.19 still, the Opposition 
did not have a plan or its ow to put forth.2o The House of Lords is not 
empowered to make or alter policy, though it can and .. quite .often does, 
debate the issues and bring them into the open for the public to study. 
Though the Lords f'ulfilled this role admirably, they did not succeed in 
crystallizing public opinion. This in itself is not surprising since the 
British people were not united as to what course to follow. 
The Lords did not begin discussion of the Amau stat~ent until 7 May 
1934, and. then as pa.rt of the general disarmament discussion. The gener-
al level ot the debate, as debates always are in the Lords, was intelli-. 
gent=ud quick to remove the excess verbiage that had grown up around the 
s~bject. Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, Chencellor of Birmingham University, 
a.nd a noted jurist, saw the Japanese declaration as a forerunner to the 
complete take-over or China by Japan. He approved of the Government's 
action in response to the Japanese statement though he had his doubts as 
to the motivation behind it; he hoped that it was not motivated by eco-
nomic interests but rather motivated by the fact that a Treaty signed by 
ms Majesty's Government had been violated. 21 The Lords who participated 
in this debate were men who had had extensive public service and were un-
usually well versed on foreign affairs. Even here, among these well in-
formed Members, there ~s no unanimity of opinion as to the proper course 
to follow. Viscount Cecil's discussion was the apogee of the discussion 
19Ibid. (Lords), XCII (7 May 1934), 22-25. 
20ibid., 45-46. 
21Ibid., 34-39. 
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in Lords and those who foll.owed him in speaking added nothing towards 
clarifying the issue. His interpretation, that this was the tirst step 
towards Ja.pan°s domination of China. was to prove true in less than a 
decade. This was one more step on the road to tulfillment·ot·the 
Japanese destiny or Hakko Iohi!, or the world under one N)Ot. 
The Press Reaction 
The British press met the Amau statement with the same varied re-
actions that were found in Parliament. The various papers.~d journals 
retleeted their biases arui prejudices when they commented on the state-
ment. The daily papers were the fairest in their treatment ot the.issue, 
though the degree ot taimess·varied trom p11blication to·:pllblication. 
. . 
'J.\l.e (London) Times, as betits its preeminent position, Jjr~sented the most 
~· .··. 
I 
.. . 
t1:,.orough and impartial account of the matter. The Tbleswas large enough 
:-. 
~ have a :run-time correspondent stationed·in Tokyo and he was at his 
:.·: I 
,,; . ... . 
~st when the statement was issued. The Manchester Guardian Weelcly. while. 
giv.lng the issue an excellent coverage, was tar more outspok$n •.. ':ftle 
Qu.a.rdian used the Reuters News Service dispatches which did a ve'f!'3' good 
job ot covering the event. 
The monthl;y and semi-monthly-magazines su~h as the.Nineteentli·centua 
!.!!!. Atter, the Fortnightly Rev.lew, and the Contemporar.y; Review_ o.tttlreg_a 
sounding boa.rd tor a wide range ot opinion, though each Qf these had its 
own pet biases and prejudices that were retlected in their editorial .. 
· -o.olum.ns and in the type ot reader's communications that ~re pri~ted. The 
most opinionated and pro-Japanese magazine was the arch-conservative 
National Review. 
l'!1.!. Times editorial ot 20 April 1934, made. a significant· stat•ent 
.. . 
to which teto1 seemed to pay much notice. It said that despite the "modest 
41 
appea.:ra.nce, the statement is the most important declaration ot Japanese 
policy in regard to China which ha.s been made for many years. tt T'.ae 
Washington correspondent of l'.b.!, Times saw the statement as an analogy to 
the infamous Twenty ... One Demands of 1915 and a changing concept of the 
Open Door policy and the integrity ot China.. 22 Ill!. 'l'bles' summation or 
the a.f'fair in their editorial column on 26 April 19'.34 said that· '!the 
latest developments at Tokyo suggest that to condemn Japanese policy 
toward China. unheard is just as premature as to applaud it. The releases 
have been unotf'icial and were not declarations or the Japanese Government." 
Th.is dispassionate summation was in sharp contrast to the blunt but ac-
curate summation of l'.h!,Manehester Guardian Weekly that:2'.3 
There is a shorter way or saying the same thing; Japan having 
failed to cow China, a strong China will be anti-Japanese, and 
therefore Japan will prevent China at all costs from becoming 
too strong. Japan seized Manchuria through China's weakness 
and will hold it so long as China remains weak and .no longer; 
therefore Japan would resist the idea that China should ••• 
receive assistance from the League that will make her stronger 
•••• Unless China is prepared to be the respecttul satel-
lite of Japan, she will become strong at her peril. 
The National Review was at the extreme end of the spectl'Ul11 in its 
~tspoken views. It was anti-Government, anti-American, anti-League of 
··')· 
~tions, anti-Chinese, but it strongly backed Japanese activity on the 
Asian mainland. It saw all the trouble in China as a result of the 
·;· 
meddling or all the Powers, except Japan, :1n the internal affairs of 
China.. Japan was merely trying to bring enlightement to the hopeless 
Chinese and all nations should leave China to Japan's tender mercies. It 
also called f'or a new .Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 24 The printed word in 
22The (London) Times, 20 April 1934, 14. 
2'.3The Manchester Guardian Weekly, 2? April 1934, 323. 
24Na.t10:nal Review, en (May 1934), 575-576. 
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. Br1. ta.in then wa.s ri~ more in agreement than was ~rliament. From the man-
in ... the ... street came the same wide range or opinions tQund in the British 
governir..g bodies. 
The French Reaction 
France tollo""red Brita.in in replying to the Ama.u statement. This was 
a pra.otioal necessity since France by herself was too weak to carry on a 
war halfway around the world.. She was more concerned with Hitler's 
threat to peace and. with her own internal problems. When Paris did ge;t 
around to replying, the note was lukewarm in tone·and the Japanese reply 
to it was readily acoepted.25 The French Government dropped the matter 
when the other Signatories declined to move. Franoef~'.?:i~estments, while 
extensive, were nowhere as large as those ot the British. The French in-
v:estments totalled less than 61, of all foreign investments in China, or 
approximately US $192,000,000.26 Besides, Franc~ could do nQt~g should 
Japan decide to take overt action to enforce the principles .of the Amau 
sj;atement. 
'.! 
The It;uian Reaction 
Italy reacted ~ch the same as France though Italy and France had 
different interests. The total Italian investments in China formed a 
b'action over 1i of the total foreign investment. In terms of US dollars 
they amounted to a mere $46,ooo,ooo.27 Mussolini, for sometime, had been 
making obvious attempts to increase Italy's infiuenoe in China ever since 
25The (London) Times, 4 May 1934, 11. 
·-
26Remer, Foreip. Inv~stments !n Jaen, Chart 2, 75. 
27Ibid., 661. 
he had clashed with Japan in Abyssinia. over trade rights in 1930. He 
also had dreams of restoriri.g to Italy some or the ancient glory that was 
Rome's. The Japanese trade attempt in Abyssinia had brought with it 
sympathy for the poor oppressed 'blacks wham Mussoloni was persecuting. That 
:"these were crocodile 'tears Gn Japan• s, ~i4t made them no less effective in 
influencing the·:na.tives. Italy soon found a chance to embarrass Japan 
and to $,Coomplish her aim or self-aggrandizement. Mussolini sent General 
. -
Lordi to China. to build up the Chinese air force and to build an air-
craft factory :1n ICia.ngsi Province. Italy also helped China with the re-
... 
vision of her penal code and with currency ref(!)rm. 28 The .Amau statement 
was clearly directed toward Italy. Italy t despite her poli~y of re-
taliation against Japan for encij("oaohing (!)n the Abyssinian market, did not 
want war in Asia as the price tor this retaliation. 
The Russian Reaction 
The initial Russian reaction to the .Amau statement was a determined 
silence.29 The Soviet press re:t'ra.ined from aey mention of the statement 
···· ............. . 
tor over a week. The :first ne~pa.per to comment was the !!, Indust~al-
, .. ' 
zatsii in an article tha.t portrayed the statement as a challenge to all 
\·' . . 
the oa.~ist nations by an Imperialism dimzy with military successes.30 
The general tenor of the Soviet press was that Japan had_expl.od~d ~ tl'ial 
bomb rather than a trial balloon. Mosoow tried to give the impression 
tha.t she had no interest in this matter, but the truth was that Ru.ssia 
28Ibid. 
29wnJ.iam Bullitt to Secretary et .. sta-ti=i, 22· AprU 1934, in u. s. 
Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1934, III, 125. 
'.30Za Industria1za.tsii, quoted. in The Maneheste; Gll~~an Weekl.y, XXX (2'7 April i934), 324. .... - - . . · 
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ns vitally concerned. If' Ja:pan intended to car--cy out the policy enunci .. 
a.ted in the .Atnau statemen·t., the Russian interests in Mongolia and Man-
churia were in danger. These interests extended back two centuries, al-
though they ctl.d not become extensive until the late Nineteenth and early 
Twentieth Centuries. Russia's single largest eoono:mio investment was the 
Chinese Eastern Railway which, built primarily for strategic purposes, 
nevertheless paid a handsome cash dividend. In terms of US dollars this 
invest.ment was $261,000,000. The total Russian investments in Manchuria, 
Mongolia.t and China proper totalled $273,000,ooo.31 Whatever course 
Russie. 0 s polit.:i.ea.1 planning would take, it would not stand by and see 
these investments disappear. The Russian diatribe depicting the situa-
tion in China. as a filling out among thieves over the loot was in keeping 
t-.ri th the Soviet character. The Communist governr11ent could never pass up 
an opportunity to ridicule the capitalistic investors even though Russia 
was the third largest investor nation in China.. The Russian press soon 
dropped the subject when it became apparent that Japan was not going to 
push the matter to its,logical conclusion. 
-
CHA.PTER V 
THE CHINESE REACTION TO THE AMAU STATEMENT 
The Chinese reaction to the Amau statement was bitter, as was ex-
,~cted. The statement was aimed at China, although if accepted, would 
.. ' ',}. . 
'· ~ 
apply to all of Asia almost automatically. Hu Shih-tseh, the Chinese 
Minister at Berne, Switzerland, gave out the following statement at a 
Geneva press conference:1 
In short, we .have now arrived at the stage of Japanese policy 
which, according to the famous Tanaka Memorandum, was to 
follow the conquest of Manchuria. · ·In that Memorandum. it was 
said that to conquer China Japan must first conquer Manchuria 
and Mongolia, and to conquer the whole world the conquest of 
China ws a necessary preliminary. It, the Memorandum said, 
the Japanese succeed in conquering China the other Asiatic 
countries would be afraid or Japan and would submit. · Then 
the world would see that Asia belonged to Japan and would no 
longer dare to violate Japanese rights. 
This was perhaps the best expressed opinion or all the Chinese reactions 
al though it ws not unique. All Asia ws awre or the danger to its 
f1eedom should Japan consummate her hegemony over China. 
Despite these fears, there was an underlying respect for Japan by 
the rest of Asia, especially China. Japan, a small Oriental country, had, 
in less than :fifty years, become a major world power on equal terms with 
the Western Nations. The example set by Japan, with her victories over 
China in 1895 and Rnssia in 1905, had given an impetus to Asian inde,.. 
pendenoe that would reaoh fulfillment shortly after 1945. It was mani-
fested against Japan herself during her period of hegemony in the Pacific 
lHu Shih ... tseh, quoted in "Chinese Diplomats and Treaty Violations,"· 
~ Manchester Guardian. Weekl:y) XXX (27 April 1934) 11 :324. 
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du.ring World War II. The Chinese respect for Japan was inspired less for 
her military achievement, which was considerable, than tor her eoonomic 
. ' 
independence from foreign control. Herein lay the tr11e secret of inde-
pendence, financial control of one•s own nation. The ~rowth of nation-
alism in China was closely linked with a desire for economic freedom. 
"The elimination or foreign control [or her economz.7 became the goal or 
China."2 This same nationalist impetus tha.t Japan had spnrred in China 
was to react against her when she tried to follow the Western imperial-
~stic course. '!he affront to Chinese sovereignty offered by the .Amau 
declaration was so obvious it need not be delineated here. The state-
ment did, however, pose a serious threat to Chinese economic independence. 
Militarily weak as she was, China had a good chance or staving off 
complete Japanese occupation by reason or her immense size. A great 
danger to China's sovereignty lay in the Am.au Declaration's implied threat 
to seize for Japan control over all foreign investments and aid tor China. 
' I : I I, 
'lb.is economic subjection is the hardest to resist or to over throw should 
it be imposed. China had for many years been the target :for :foreign 
speculation and economic exploitation, but she had staved o;ff ~ one 
Power gaining control by p1!1ying one against the other. Should Japan 
make her claim good, China would be lost. 
Japan, the second largest investor in China, was exceeded only by 
Great Bri_tain. Japan• s investments, in terms of United States dollars 
was $1,136,900,000.3 Britain's also in terms or US dollars was 
$1,189;200,000.4 A comparison of these two countries• investments in 
2Harold M. Vina.eke, A Historz ot the Far :East ,!!l Modern Times, 5th 
ed. (New York I Appleto_n-Century-Crorts -;-T950Y, -wn". · .. 
3c. F. Remert Foreign Investments ~ Chinat Table 39, 553. 
4ibid. 
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China revealed that Japan despite her slightly smaller investment was in 
a much better pcsition to achieve economic domination over China than 
Britain or any other foreign cC111ntry. The two cited tables above (n. 3 
and 4), show that Britain had 36. 71, or all foreign investments in China, 
and Japan had 35.1~. or the direct trade with China, Japan controlled 
24.7'1, to Britain's 7.~. In shipping, Britain had 36.~ while Japan had 
29.;i. In the number of firms owned or controlled in China by foreigners, 
Ja:pan had a commanding lead of 55.~ to Britain's low 12.~. Fimally, in 
percentage of fC:>reign pop.tla tion resident in China, Japan outweighed all 
the other Pm,ers combined with a total of 70.61,. Thus, one can readily 
see that Japan was only slightly behind Britain in shipping and total in-
vestment, but she was far ahead of Britain in domination or the economic 
factors tha,t gave Japan a better opportunity to control Chinese economics 
and ultimately to force the rest of the Powers out. These factors were 
direct trade, number of firms actually operating in China and a -large 
Japanese population living in China. The bulk or this Japanese group was 
resident in Manchuria. A. further danger, and one that could back up the 
Japanese threat was the large mili'tary force kept in Manchuria by Japan, 
the Kwantung Army. In addition, Japan kept the main &?my' in readiness in 
the homeland and had troops stationed in Korea and Formosa. These mili-
~ary forces were much more prepared to fight than were any or the other 
P0wers. Thus, Japan was in a strc,ng pc:>sitien to enforce the .Amau state-
ment should she wish to do so. Japan had risen from last place, asan 
investor, inl900 to the second largest by 1930. To continue her growth 
and to become the first Power in China, both economically and militarily, 
the other Powers must be forced out or China or at least reduced to a much 
smaller role. The Am.au statement, might well have been the first step to 
Japan's eventual take-over or all China. 
CHAPTER VI 
WHY WAS THE A.MAU STATEMENT ISSUED? 
Immediately upon its issuance, speculation was rife throughout the 
world as to why Japan took this step. Two New X2rls, Times correspondents, 
Rugh By'a.s in Tokyo, and Hallett Abend in Shanghai, saw the .Amau state-
. ' 
ment as an error in timing on the part ot the Japanese Foreign Office1 
but a trae retlectiC!>n of Japanese policy. An error bec_ause the Japanese 
Government had been so assidiously cultivating good relations with the 
Western Powers. Now, all these efforts were wasted. Wilfred Fleischer 
of the Japan Advertiser and the New York Herald-Tribune saw this as a 
..._....___.... - I 
blunder on Amau's part, due to his.l~ck of news sense and timing. 2 The 
principles of the statements were not new, they had been in practice for 
many years, but they had not been proclaimed. Amau's immediate superior; 
Vice-Foreign M:inis:ter Shigemitsu Mamoru, felt that Amau had done nothing 
wrong since he merely gave out an innocuous s:tatement in reply to 
questions from the vernacular newspapers. The mistake, according to 
Shigemitsu, was in the mishandlipg of' the statement by the foreign press.3 
!h!, (London) Times oo:rrespondent cabled his paper on 29 April 1934 that 
· tne·:sta.tement was instigated by Foreign Minister Hirota, who was using 
lRugh Byas, ,!e ~- Times, 21 April 1934, 32; 29 April l934, l; 
Hallett Abend, Ibid., 20 April 1934, 10. . 
2W11frid Fleischer, Volcanic Isle, 260. 
- . 
3shigemitsu Mamoru, Japan .!:l2. ~ Destin;r, 99. 
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Amau. as a front for his own machinations. 4 Where he obtained this info3:• .. 
mation was never determined. Joseph c. Grew, the American Ambassador to 
Japan, writing in later years felt that Amau was merely carrying out 
orders when he made his famous statement • .5 Grew, however, believed that 
.Am.au was not.following the orders of his superiors in the Foreign Office, 
but had succumbed to pressure from the ultra-nationalists within the 
6 . . 
Army. Professor Nathaniel Peffer of Columbia University believed that 
Amau was a gross opportunist ind a COlllpJiant stooge of the militarists, 
and had voluntarily sided with them in the hope of future gain.? 
Less severe in his assessment attitude was G. Eo Hubbard, the author 
of the Far Eastern section of the survey£!:. Int~rnational Affairs,~, 
j "j' 
and a member of the editorial board of The New York Times. He saw this 
-----
as a ••trial balloon" on the part of the Japanese government, a balloon 
that failed to rise.8 The trial balloon was an ancient diplomatic de~ 
vice whereby a government could issue a statement and if it was not well 
received, could deny its authenticity. Japan felt the foreign atd to 
China was detrimental to her own program in China,9 hence, the trial 
4The (London) Times, 30 April 1934, 14. 
5J., C., Grew, Turbulent~, II, 9.58. 
6orew to Hull, 20 April 1934, .E2re;,m Relation;!9 1934, III, 119; 
Tllrbulent Era, II, 960; !Efil Years !n: Jamn, 14'9. 
?Nathaniel Peffer, ~Far~: A Modern History (Ann Arbor, Uni-
versity of Michigan Press, 1958"), 371. ·.. ' 
80. E. Hubbard, Survey .2!, International Affairs, ~, 650; New 12!.k 
Tim.es 11 19 April 1934, 24. · . · 
9yanaga. Chitoshi, Ja;en Since Per;rz (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949), 
.567; Hishi. •da Seiji, ,ia~an 1!1ong ~ Great Powers (New York: Longmans, 
Green and Co., 1940), 53; E., L ... Presseisen, Germa~ ~ Ja~. 5: !)_ Stud;ir !!!. xota.lita.rian Diplomacz (The Hague8 Maritinus NiJhoff' 195 , 72; . 
Crispi.an Corcoran, "Hands Off China," The Nation. CXXXVIII (6 June 1934), 
644; Wo No Medlioott, British Foreign Poiicy SinQ2_ Versailles (London: 
so 
balloon to ascertain the reaction ot the other Potrers whioh had interests 
in China. This was due te Japa.n11 s traditionally China orientated foreign 
policy. A strong China meant a diminution, ot Japanese influence in 
Asia. Still, others saw this as Japan's attempt to trighten-;.China into 
line with Japanese policy by proving to China that the other Powers could 
,• ' I 
not be relied upon tor help.lo This thesis was soon discredited when the 
Powers, while not wanting war over the Amau statement, would not back 
down either. George E. Sokolsky, a correspondent tor 12:!!. ~ I2!k Times, 
believed that Japan teared the possible danger of one or more Powers 
. . 11 
gaining a. military base in China trom which J"pa.n might be attacked. 
Soviet Russia. was the chief' suspect in this case.12 
vllile many Asian experts have propounded man,y·reasons for the is-
suance of' the .Amau statement, few have asked Ama.u himself'. Why this 
state or a.f'ta.irs had existed, is hard to determine. One of the few, how-
ever, _who did ask, was Joseph c •. ~rew. Ambassador Grew, reported .that 
Am.au in a private conversation, "asserted that the statement was issued 
as sort of a preliminary to the forthcoming naval conference, which would 
be a. ~uccess if Japan's thesis regarding assistance to China is accepted 
by the other Powers and which would tail it th~ thesis is not 
Me. th.-a.en and Co., 1940), 20J; A. Morgan Young, l!nperial Japan, 1926-193~, 
(New York: William Morrow and Co., 1938), 205; John Ahlers, Jaen c!osrng 
!b!. ~ R.22£. !,u China (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1940), 11; Meri.beth 
Cameron, et al., China, Japan and the Powers, 456; Business Week, 5 May 
1934, 30. · - -
lOF. c. Jones, Japan's New Order .!n, l'!.!!i Asia: lli Rise !!!2, Fall, 
W.1·1942 (London: Oxford.University .Press, 19~ 21; c .. K. Websier, 111apan and China," Contempora.;::,y Review, CXXXXVI (6 June 1934), 655. 
llThe . !!?! !.2£! Times, VIII, 29 April 1934, 1. 
12w. G. Fitz-Gerald, "Japan11 s Monroe Doctrine," lh!. !1,neteenth 
Centuu !!S, After, CXV ( June 1934), 64o; co c.. Tansill, ~ ~ l2. Wa~: 
The Roosevelt Foreign Policz,. ~-1941 (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., · · f952j, 136. · 
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acoepted • .,13 
Th.us we see that the motivation for the statement, as expressed by 
its '.1ut.hor, was a. statement of Japan• s position in China. Should this 
thesis be aocept.ed by the world Japan would be a major Power with a 
t .. 
recognized need tor a larger Navy. Japan had felt, E*Ver since the 
'Gtlshington and London Naval Conferences, that she had need of a larger 
Navy tor national defense. Not only did sh.e feel insecure w1 th what she 
believed to be an interior Navy but her overweening pride was wounded. 
That the implications of the statements range,d ta~er than intended and 
created a turorin the capitals of the world was unfortunate. Fortunate-
ly, the consequences were few, w:l:th this being one more false alarm, but 
it was apparent to the world, indeed if it was not already so, that a 
., 
\general war in Asia was not too tar distant should the world political 
movements continue on their present courses. America was shaken a little 
out other lethargic state and the world was racked by one more political 
tremor. The voicing of such a statement in a tension ridden world plagued 
with insoluble problems, both at home and abroad, was blown up into gi-
. . ..
gantio size with littJ.e effort. That war did not come derived from the 
., . 
reluctance of all parties to engage in one. Each had its own internal 
' . ; . 
problems that weighed heavily upon the nation; more problems were not 
needed. 
13a.rew to Hull, 20 .April 1934, Foreign Relations. 12J!t, III, 119. 
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APPENDIX A 
UNOFFICIAL STATEMENT BY THE JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE, APRIL 17, 1934 
Owing to the special position of Japan in her relations with China, 
h~r views and attitude respecting matters that cor1cern China, may not 
agree in every point with those of foreign nations: but it must be real-
ized that Japan is called upon to exert the utmo$t effort in carrying out 
her mission and in f'ulfilling her special responsibilities in F.a.st Asia. 
Japan has been compelled to withdraw from the League or Nations be-
cause or their failure to agree in their opinions on the funda.mental 
principles of preserving peace in East Asia. Although Japan's attitude 
toward China may at times differ from that of foreign countries, such 
difference cannot be evaded, owing to Japan°s position and mission. 
It goes without saying that Japan at all times is endeavoring to 
maintain and promote her friendly relations with foreign nations• but at 
the same time we consider it only natural that, to keep peace and order 
in East Asia, we must.even a.ct alone on our own responsibility and it is 
our duty to perform it. At the same time, there is no country but China 
which is in a position to share with Japan the responsibility for the 
maintenance of peace in Ea$t Asia. Accordingly, unification of China 9 
preservation of her territorial integrity, as well as restoration of 
order in that country, are most ardently desired by Japan.. History shows 
that these can be attained through no other means than the awakening and 
the voluntary efforts of China. herself .. We oppose therefore any attempt 
on the pa.rt of China to avail herself of the influence of any other 
country in order to resist Japan: We also oppose any action taken by Chir,ia, 
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calculated to play one power against another. Any joint operations 
undertaken by f'oreign powers even in the name of' technical or financial 
assistance at this particular ~oment after the Manchurian and Shanghai 
Incidents are bound to acquire political significance. Undertakings of 
such nature, if carried through to the end, must give rise to complica-
tions -that might eventually naQessitate discussion of problems like 
fixing spheres of inrluence or even international control or division of 
China, which would be the greatest possible misfortune for China and at 
the smrie time would have the most serious repercussion upon Japan and 
East Asia. Japan therefore must object to such undertakings as a matter 
of principle, although she will not find it necessary to interfere with 
any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of 
finance or trade, as long as such negotiations benefit China. and are not 
detrimental to the maintenance of p~ace in East Asia. 
However, supplying China w.lth war planes, building aerodromes in 
China and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China 
i 
or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses, would ob ... 
viously tend to alienate the friendly relations between Japan and China 
and other countries and to disturb peaee and orde! in East Asia. Japan 
will oppose such projects. 
The foregoing attitude of' Japan should be clear from the policies 
she has pursued in the past. But, on account of the fact that positive 
movements tor joint action in China by foreign powers under one pretext 
or another are reported to be on root, it is _deemed not inappropriate to 
reiterate her policy at this time. 
APPENDIX B 
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES (Commons), CCLXXXVIII, 1368 
Owing to special position of Ja.pan :i,n her relations with China her 
views and attitude respecting matters that concern China may not agree 
in every point with those of foreign nations; but it must be realised 
that Japan is called upon to exert the utmost effort in carrying out her 
mission and in tulfilling her special responsibilities in F.ast Asia. 
Japan has been compelled to withdraw from the League of Nations because 
of their failure to agree in their opinions on fundamental principles of 
preserving peace in East Asia. Although Japan•s attitude towards China 
ma.y at times differ from that of foreign c:ountries such difference cannot 
be evaded owing to Japan's position and missiono 
It goes without saying that Japan at all times is endeavouring to 
maintain and promote her friendly relations with foreign nations, but at 
the same time we consider it only natural that to keep peace and order 
in East Asia we must even a.ct alone on our own responsibility and it is 
our duty to perform. it. At the same time there is no country bu.t China 
which is in a position to share with Japan the responsibility for mainte-
nance of peace in East Asia. 
Accordingly, unification of China, preservation of her territorial 
integrity as well as restoration of order in that country are most ar-
dently desired by Japan. History shows these can be attained through no 
other means than ~wakening and voluntary efforts of China herselfo 
We oppose, therefore, any attempt on the part or Chir.a to avail her~ 
self of' the infl.uence of any other country in order to resist Japan; we 
64 
65 
also oppose any acti9n taken by China. calculated to play one Power 
against another. Any joint op~rations undertaken by foreign Powers even 
in the name of technical or financial assistance at this particular 
moment after Manchurian and Shanghai incidents are bound to acquire 
political significance .. Undertakings of such nature if carried through 
to the end must give rise to complications that might eventually necessi-
tate discussion of problems like division of China which would be the 
greatest possible misfortune for China. and at the same time would have 
most serious repercussion upon Japan and East Asia.. 
Japan therefore must object to such undertakings as a matter of 
principle, although she will not find it necessary to interfere with any 
foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of fi .. 
nanee or trade as long as such negotiations benefit China and are not 
detrimental to peace in East Asia.. 
However, supplying China with war aeroplanes, building aerodromes in 
China, and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China 
or contracting a loan to provide f'un~s for political uses would obviously 
tend to alienate friendly relations between Japan, China and other 
countries and to disturb peace and order in Ea.stern Asia. Japan will op,., 
pose such projects. 
Foregoing attitude (?.f Japan should be clear from poU,.cies she has 
pursued in the past, but on account of the fa.ct that positive movements 
for joint action in China by foreign Powers under one pretext or another 
a.~e reported to be on foot it was deemed not inappropriate to reiterate 
her policy at this time. 
APPENDIX C 
CHINA YEAR BOC>K, 1934 
Accordingly; unification of ,China, prese~ation of her territorial 
integrity, as well as restoration of order ~n that country, are most ar-
··~. 
dently desired by Japan. Histoey shows th.at th-e can be attained 
through no other means than the awakeni~g and the voluntary efforts ot 
China herself. 
We oppose therefore any attempt on the part of China to avail her-
self of the influence of any other country in o~der to resist Japan; we 
also oppose any action taken by China, oalculated~to ~ay one Power 
against another. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign Powers, even 
in.the name of technical or financial assistance, at this particular 
moment after the Manchurian and Shanghai Inci.dents, are bound to acquire 
' political significance. Undertakings of such nature, it carried throu~h 
to the end,. must give rise to complications that might eventually ne-
cessitate discussions of problems like fixing spheres of influence or 
even international control or division for China, which would be the 
gre8:test possible misfortune for China and at the same time would have 
the most serious repercussion upon Japan and East Asia. 
. . 
Japan, therefore, must object to such undertakings as a matter of 
principle, although she will not find·it necessary to interfere with any 
foreign countey negotiating individually with China on questions or fi-
nance or trade, as long as such negotiations benefit China and are not 
detrimental to the maintenance of peace in the Far :East. 
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However, supplying China with war planes, building aerodromes in 
China and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China, 
or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses, would ob-
viously tend to alienate the friendly relations between Japan and China 
and other countries and to disturb peace and order in F,ast Asia. Japan 
will oppose such projects. 
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The foregoing attitude of Japan should be clear from the policies 
she has pursued in the past, but on account of the fact that positive 
movements ~,er joint action in China by foreign Powers, under one pretext 
or another, are reported to be on foot, it is deemed not inappropriate to 
reiterate her policy. 
APPENDIX D 
l']! !lli !QB! ...,TIME......__s 
' 
Japan has no wish to infringe on the independence, interests or 
prosperity of China. As regards Manchukuo • we ask the other powers to 
recognize the fair and free actions of that country. Neither in Ma.n-
chukuo nor in China have we any territorial ambitions. 
Japan is geographically in a position to share in the trade and 
profits if China is united and developed, but the unification and pros-
perity of China must be attained by her own awakening and not by selfish 
exploitation by other powers. 
We have no intention to interfere with the interests of third 
parties. If other powers engage in trade with China, for the b.enefit of 
China, we welcome it. We have no desire to deviate from the policy of 
the open door and equal opportunity or to infringe treatie$, but Japan 
objects to any action whatsoever by other powers that may lead to dis-
"blrbance of peace and order in Eastern Asia. 
Japan bears the responsibility for maintenance of peace and order in 
Eastern Asia with other Asiatic powers, particularly China. The time has 
passed when other powers, or the L~ague, can exercise their policies only 
for the exploitation of China.. 
*The last sentence is said to be omitted in the official translation. 
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